1. Implications of Ingroup-Outgroup Membership for Interpersonal Perceptions

Faces and Emotion

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Authors’ Note

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Introduction

Nonverbal behavior is a critical component of social interaction. People rely on nonverbal aspects of behavior during interactions to assess how their interaction partners are feeling and how to respond to them (Feldman, Philippot, & Custrini, 1991). One aspect of nonverbal behavior that can be influential in shaping the dynamics of interpersonal interaction is the communication of emotion. Indeed, the ability to accurately decode the emotional states of others from nonverbal facial and vocal cues has been found to predict social competence (e.g., Feldman et al., 1991; Glanville & Nowicki, 2002).

Recent research suggests that cultural-group membership may play an important role in the accurate communication (i.e., encoding and decoding) of emotion (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002a, 2002b). Building on this work, we propose that the psychological processes associated with social categorization and social identity produce systematic biases in the recognition of emotion from facial expressions across members of different groups. Thus, the present chapter examines emotional facial expression and communication in an intergroup context. To provide a general conceptual foundation for the relevance of group membership to the communication of emotion, we begin by briefly reviewing how group membership fundamentally affects the way people think.
about, feel about, and act toward others. We then examine research that
directly studies how group membership affects the communication of
emotion in the face and how members of different groups, defined by
majority and minority status, may be differentially successful at recog-
nizing and interpreting the emotions displayed by outgroup members.
We then consider the systematic nature of emotion recognition accuracy
and inaccuracy through an examination of potential mechanisms that
might contribute to differences in emotion recognition between mem-
bers of different groups. Finally, we conclude with a conceptual analysis
of how the study of facial expression complements previous research on
intergroup bias and offers potentially unique theoretical and practical
insights into understanding intergroup communication, miscommuni-
cation, and relations.

Psychological Impact of Group Membership

Group membership and identity have a profound influence on social
perception, affect, cognition, and behavior. People spontaneously cat-
gerize others as members of social groups, and they fundamentally
distinguish those who are members of their own group from those
who are members of other groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg,
Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Perceptually, when people or objects
are categorized into groups, actual differences between members of
the same category tend to be minimized and often ignored in mak-
ning decisions or forming impressions, whereas between-group differ-
ences tend to become exaggerated (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Members of
other groups are generally perceived to be more similar to one another
than are members of one’s own group (Mullen & Hu, 1989). Paralleling
these effects, at a basic perceptual level, people have more difficul-
ty recognizing outgroup members than ingroup members, more fre-
cently confusing outgroup members with one another (Meissner &
Brigham, 2001). Cognitively, people retain more information in a more
detailed fashion for ingroup members than for outgroup members (Park
& Rothbart, 1982). Emotionally, people spontaneously experience more
positive affect toward members of the ingroup than toward members
of the outgroup (Otten & Moskowitz, 2000). And, behaviorally, people
are more pro-social toward ingroup than outgroup members (Dovidio,
Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997). In part as a conse-
quence of these biases, people have more frequent interaction with mem-bers of their own group than other groups (Brigham, 2005). Greater

contact and more frequent interaction produce greater perceptual
and cognitive differentiation (Linville, Fischer, & Salovey, 1989) and
present more opportunities to develop and refine the ability to inter-
pret accurately the behaviors of others.

Taken together, the greater perceptual sensitivity, cognitive elabora-
tion, affective reactions, and behavioral orientations that people have
with ingroup than with outgroup members implicate group mem-
bership as an important factor for the communication of emotion. Specif-
ically, these processes converge to suggest that people will show greater
sensitivity and accuracy in judging the emotional expressions of ingroup
than outgroup members.

A second critical element of group membership – one that also is
relevant to the communication of emotion – involves the hierarchical
organization of groups. In part as a consequence of the factors associ-
ated with group categorization, groups tend to relate to one another
hierarchically. In fact, Sidanius and Pratto (1999) argue that this type of
social dominance is a universal organizing principle in human societies.
Differences in group status, in turn, influence the perceptual, cognitive,
affective, and behavioral responses of group members in systematic
ways. In general, people who have high social status have more freedom
of movement and thus may be more open in intergroup encounters
than low-status individuals. Conversely, low-status people tend to be
inhibited in their actions, particularly in encounters with high-status
people (see Ellyson & Dovidio, 1985). In addition, low-status people
monitor the specific behaviors and reactions of their interaction partners
more closely than do high-status interactants, who are more likely to
rely on stereotypes based on the partner’s group membership. Keltner,
Gruenfeld, and Anderson (2003) argue that high power and status are
associated with a general approach orientation, whereas low power and
status are related to inhibition.

These processes also have direct implications for the communica-
tion of facial expressions. First, because high-status individuals are
less inhibited in their behaviors than low-status individuals, members
of high-status groups may be more expressive than members of low-
status groups, particularly in intergroup encounters. Consistent with
this, individual status exerts a strong influence on nonverbal behavior
between people. In a meta-analytic review of the literature, Hall, Coats,
and Smith LeBeau (2005) found that people who have higher status or
social power show greater facial expressiveness than those with low sta-
tus or power. Also, members of low-status groups, such as stigmatized
groups, tend to be more inhibited than members of high-status (i.e., nonstigmatized) groups in their emotional expressiveness (Frale, Blackstone, & Scherbaum, 1990). Second, because low-status individuals monitor the actions of high-status individuals particularly closely, members of low-status groups may be more accurate at decoding the facial expressions of others, particularly in intergroup situations, than high-status people (Henley, 1977; LaFrance & Henley, 1994).

In sum, social categorization initiates a range of perceptual, cognitive, and affective processes that produce more differentiated impressions of ingroup than outgroup members, which suggests that people should be more accurate at judging the emotional expressions of ingroup than outgroup members. Moreover, the closer and more frequent interaction among ingroup than outgroup members produces greater familiarity and experience that further contribute to increased accuracy in interpreting the expressions and behaviors of ingroup compared to outgroup members. However, group status may moderate this effect, such that increased accuracy in recognizing emotions from facial expressions for ingroup versus outgroup members might be more pronounced among members of low-status than high-status groups. In the next section, guided by this framework, we briefly review the literature on group differences in emotion recognition.

**Group Differences in Emotion Recognition**

In general, people are quite adept at recognizing the emotions displayed in the faces of members of different groups, nations, and cultures (Ekman, 1972; Izard, 1971). Largely based on these findings, emotional facial displays have been thought of as largely universal (Ekman, 1994). Despite the evidence in favor of universality, however, there is also accompanying evidence revealing cultural variations in recognizing expressions of emotion. In an effort to understand and organize the emotion recognition literature, Elfenbein and Ambady (2002a) conducted a meta-analysis of studies bearing on both the universality and cultural specificity of emotion recognition. Although they found overwhelming evidence to support the universality hypothesis—that is, participants were consistently able to detect the emotions displayed in the faces of outgroup members at better than chance levels—they also found evidence suggestive of cultural specificity. That is, they found that individuals were better able to decode the emotions expressed by individuals sharing their own cultural background than those expressed by individuals from a different cultural background (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002b). The ingroup advantage was observed in studies using a variety of experimental methods, for both positive and negative emotions, and in different nonverbal channels of communication, including both facial expressions and tone of voice (but see Matsumoto, 2002, for a critique).

One clear deviation from the ingroup advantage, however, was among members of minority groups. Specifically, the ingroup advantage was considerably smaller and sometimes nonexistent for studies in which members of minority groups were judging the emotions of members of majority groups from the same nation. For example, Nowicki, Glanville, and Demertzis (1998) found that white college students were better able to decode emotion in the faces of other white targets (i.e., posers) than emotion in the faces of black targets, but black college students were equally able to decode emotion in the faces of white and black targets. Similarly, Collins and Nowicki (2001) found that black and white children were equally accurate at decoding the emotions of white targets. However, the overall pattern of accuracy in recognition of emotional facial expression is consistent with our expectations. We consider potential mediators and moderators of this effect in the next section.

**Moderators and Mediators of the Ingroup Advantage**

As outlined earlier, social categorization and identity arouse a range of perceptual and cognitive biases, with systematic social consequences, that can operate independently or in concert to produce intergroup differences in the accurate recognition and interpretation of emotional facial expressions. We first consider two explanations for the ingroup advantage that relate to social interaction within and between groups: familiarity and cultural differences. Then, we consider three additional explanations for the ingroup advantage that relate to general intergroup psychological processes identified previously: attention, bias, and power.

**Familiarity**

Elfenbein and Ambady (2002a) proposed that cultural familiarity is an important moderator of the ingroup advantage effect. Specifically, their meta-analysis revealed that the ingroup advantage was smaller for groups with greater exposure to one another. For instance, cross-cultural
accuracy was greater for groups living in the same country than for groups living across national borders. Furthermore, differential familiarity explained the tendency for members of minority groups to reveal less of an ingroup advantage than members of majority groups and sometimes even to reveal an outgroup advantage (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002a, 2002b). Because of the sheer differences in number, members of minority groups have more opportunities to interact with members of majority groups than the reverse.

Consistent with this interpretation, Elfenbein and Ambady (2003) found that accuracy in decoding the emotional expression of European American models in photographs was greatest among European Americans, followed in order by Chinese Americans, Chinese nationals living in the United States, and Chinese citizens living in China. Chinese citizens in China were most accurate at judging the emotions of Chinese models. In a second study, Elfenbein and Ambady (2003) fully decoupled cultural familiarity with ingroup membership by testing the accuracy with which Tibetan individuals living in China and African individuals living in the United States could recognize the emotional expressions displayed by Chinese and American models. Consistent with the familiarity argument, the Tibetan participants were both more accurate and faster at recognizing the Chinese compared to the American facial expressions, and the African participants were more accurate and faster with the American compared to the Chinese facial expressions. These findings provide support for the role of familiarity in generating the ingroup advantage for emotion recognition.

Although the evidence for the role of familiarity in the ingroup advantage in emotion recognition is compelling, other processes may also be involved and, in fact, may help explain why greater familiarity reduces group differences in emotion recognition accuracy. For instance, greater familiarity with members of other groups may enhance the ability to recognize and interpret cultural differences in emotion display and decoding rules.

**Cultural Differences: Display Rules, Decoding Rules, and Nonverbal Accents**

In the emotion recognition literature, several factors have been proposed to explain cultural differences in emotional-face recognition. Ekman argued that although emotions are basic, there are cultural differences in the norms that govern the outward display of emotion (Ekman, 1972).

Accordingly, the emotional displays produced by members of some cultures are more difficult to decode (i.e., the displays are not encoded as clearly) than those of other cultures. In contrast to differences in encoding, Matsumoto (1989, 1992) argued that emotional-expression decoding rules (cf. Buck, 1984) differ as a function of culture. Thus, in some cultures, it is impolite to observe certain emotions (largely negative) in other individuals; consequently, members of these cultures may be less likely to attribute certain emotions to another individual based on their facial displays than members of other cultures.

As mentioned previously, Elfenbein and Ambady (2002a) found that a match between the group membership of the encoder and the decoder resulted in better emotion recognition than a mismatch, also known as the ingroup advantage. One possible explanation for the advantage is that shared cultural-group membership is accompanied by an ingroup understanding and congruence of both display rules and decoding rules. For instance, members of a specific culture may tend to display certain emotions with less intensity because of display rules. They have been socialized in the culture and, therefore, are accustomed to observing the muted form of the expression. However, other members of the same culture may be more likely to recognize the subtle cues associated with these muted expressions than members of a different culture. In other words, a relatively ambiguous, low-intensity angry expression may be perceived and interpreted as a clear display of anger by ingroup members but completely missed or misinterpreted by outgroup members. Furthermore, members of the same culture are more likely to be aware of the specific situations in which display rules tend to affect emotional expression, resulting in more accurate emotion recognition, than that found for outgroup members.

Similarly, a mismatch in decoding rules may make it difficult to accurately interpret emotion across group boundaries. If perceiving anger is relatively shunned in an individual's culture, then he or she may be less likely to accurately detect (or report) anger from the face of an outgroup member. It is also possible, however, that display and decoding rules may work against the ingroup advantage. Cultural norms that limit the expression of certain emotions also tend to limit the interpretation and perception of the same emotions. In other words, display and decoding rules are often linked (Matsumoto, Kasri, & Kook, 1999). The match between display and decoding rules may lead an individual to suppress their anger but also lead a member of the same culture to ignore and perhaps even misperceive any anger that did form.
on the expressor’s face. Consequently, rather than increasing accuracy, shared cultural display and decoding rules may actually undermine the accuracy with which members of the same group interpret emotional facial displays.

As an alternative to the display and decoding rules explanations for the ingroup advantage of emotion recognition, Marsh, Elfenbein, and Ambady (2003) developed the theory of nonverbal accents. The theory suggests that, like different languages, emotional expressions may also have features that vary across cultures. American, British, and Australian English all have many similarities and are essentially the same language, but they also differ in important ways that serve to differentiate members of the three cultures. Similarly, emotional expressions are predicted to vary in subtle ways. For instance, Marsh et al. (2003) asked a sample of North Americans to categorize the nationalities of photographs of nine Japanese nationals and nine Japanese Americans bearing one of five emotional facial expressions (e.g., anger, fear, surprise; or a neutral pose). Participants were able to accurately categorize the targets into national groups at better than chance levels for photographs with either neutral or emotional facial expressions; however, they were more accurate for the emotional rather than the neutral faces. In other words, aspects of the facial expressions themselves sufficiently differentiated the two sets of targets (i.e., American and Japanese), and the North American participants were able to tell which set was American.

This result is even more impressive given that the faces used in the experiment were drawn from a set that had undergone extensive pretesting and found to be equivalent on all dimensions relevant to emotion recognition. In other words, it was thought that potential cultural differences had been removed through the rigorous selection process. One possible explanation for Marsh et al.’s (2003) findings is that differences in facial morphology contributed to the observed effects. Recall that participants in the study were able to detect target nationality at better than chance levels in both the neutral facial displays and the emotional displays. There is some evidence suggesting that facial morphology can contribute to the interpretation — and sometimes misinterpretation — of emotional expressions (Beaupré & Hess, 2005; Hess, Adams, & Kleck, 2004). Furthermore, the fact that the participants in the Marsh et al. (2003) study were significantly better able to detect target nationality in the emotional compared with the neutral faces suggests that slight morphological differences may be accentuated by the expression of emotion.

And, by extension, if there are nonverbal accents in emotional displays, even if they are attributable to differences in facial morphology, then ingroup members are likely to recognize the accents of other members of their culture more than members of a different culture. Consequently, it is likely that ingroup members are better able to decode subtle nonverbal accents and, therefore, emotional displays more generally than outgroup members.

As a whole, this work suggests that cultural differences dictating the expression and decoding of emotion contribute to emotion recognition accuracy. Elfenbein and colleagues (Marsh et al., 2003; Elfenbein & Ambady, 2003) suggest that the match between the cultural group memberships of encoders and decoders allows for optimal recognition accuracy because individuals are more likely to share encoding and decoding rules, as well as subtle differences in expressive style — what they call nonverbal accents. Clearly, familiarity with a culture may also make one more knowledgeable about cultural norms regarding encoding and decoding, as well as nonverbal accents. Thus, people may be better able to decode emotion within group boundaries.

Familiarity with members of other social groups and knowledge of the social rules for displaying and decoding emotion may also exert their effects through general psychological mechanisms. In the remainder of this section, we consider three such intergroup mechanisms: attention, biases, and power.

Attention

The nonverbal-accent theory presents the argument that members of different cultures may express the same emotion in different ways that are subtle but meaningful nonetheless. If this is the case, as suggested in the Marsh et al. (2003) experiment, then attentional processes may piggyback on these subtle differences making outgroup emotion recognition more difficult than ingroup emotion recognition. That is, individuals may not be aware of the subtle differences that shape emotional expression in different cultures and, therefore, fail to attend to important cues associated with the expression of the emotion in the outgroup. For instance, blushing may be a cue to embarrassment in racial groups with paler skin tones but not for groups with darker skin tones. Because of this difference, members of groups with paler skin may not detect that a darker skinned person is embarrassed because blushing is not evident.
Attentional differences of this type have been theorized to underlie facial recognition across group boundaries (Brigham, 2005). Reliance on individual cues that are effective in one’s own culture (e.g., eye color) but less discriminating in a different culture is thought to contribute to individuals’ relatively poor ability to remember racial outgroup members relative to racial ingroup members.

In addition to the perceptual role for attention, differences in motivation may implicate attention in the manifestation of the ingroup advantage. As individuals navigate their social worlds, they often behave like “cognitive misers,” only processing information that is relevant to their goals or needs (Fiske, Lin, & Neuberg, 1999). People may rely on group memberships to direct attention to strangers, with the default strategy of attempting to individuate ingroup members but only categorizing or perhaps even completely ignoring outgroup members (Sporer, 2001). Outgroup membership may serve as a cue to disregard a stranger, unless there is some other contextual factor that makes the stranger worthy of further consideration and/or individuation (Rodin, 1987). An examination of attentional biases of this type revealed that college students tended to disregard middle-aged strangers with whom they had a brief interaction but not strangers who were closer to their own age (Rodin, 1987). In other words, age served as a cue regarding whether to allocate attention to other individuals.

Additional research suggests that there may be a general tendency to direct attention to ingroup rather than to outgroup members. Specifically, using a dot-probe test of visual attention, Trawalter (2005) found that white participants located a dot more quickly if it was in the same location where a white face had been previously than if it was in the same location where a black face had been. Because white participants allocated more attention to other white faces than they did to black faces, they located the dot faster when it appeared in the white face location (Eberhardt, Goff, Purdie, & Davies, 2004). Thus, participants revealed an ingroup attentional advantage. It is interesting, however, that a subsequent experiment with black participants found no significant bias toward ingroup faces. Perhaps like the ingroup-advantage effect and the cross-race memory effect (Brigham, 2005), low-status minority-group members are less likely to reveal an ingroup attentional bias. Nevertheless, if individuals pay differential levels of attention to ingroup and outgroup members in their environments, then they may also process ingroup and outgroup emotional faces differently and, consequently, acquire differential levels of skill at decoding the emotional expressions of ingroup and outgroup members.

Biases (Ingroup Favoritism, Stereotypes, and Prejudice)

The aforementioned attentional bias for ingroup over outgroup members suggests that basic processes associated with group membership contribute to the ingroup advantage in emotion recognition. One of the most pervasive effects of social categorization is ingroup favoritism (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). When individuals are assigned to a group, even on relatively arbitrary and meaningless grounds, they tend to favor other members of their newly assigned group compared to members of an alternate group (Turner et al., 1987). Ingroup favoritism recently has been found to influence beliefs about the emotional qualities of different groups (e.g., Leyens et al., 2000). For instance, Beaupré and Hess (2003) examined the attributions that European Canadians made regarding the likely emotional facial behavior of European, African, and Asian targets in response to a relatively neutral scenario. After reading the scenario, participants were asked to select from among a sample of target photographs the facial display that best represented the emotion experienced by the protagonist of the scenario. The facial displays were either neutral or varied in smiling intensity, ranging from a miserable smile (i.e., a smile with a frown) to an extremely intense smile (i.e., a strong smile with significant wrinkling around the eyes). Results revealed that participants attributed smiles denoting positive affect more often when the protagonist was identified (by photograph) as an ingroup member compared to when the protagonist was identified as an outgroup member (either African or Asian). In contrast, participants attributed a neutral facial expression to outgroup members more frequently than to ingroup members. In a follow-up study, participants of Asian and African ancestry revealed a similar pattern of ingroup bias.

Beaupré and Hess’s (2003) findings suggest that the interpretation of emotional experiences is subject to ingroup favoritism. Individuals seem to be predisposed to perceive ingroup members as smiling and perhaps sociable, even when the context does not necessarily trigger positive affect. Research suggests, however, that smiling behavior may be just the tip of the proverbial iceberg regarding differential emotional attributions for ingroup and outgroup members. Specifically, Leyens et al. (2000) argue that a wide array of emotions is attributed to ingroup but
not to outgroup members. In their theory of infrahumanization, Leyens et al. (2000) propose that some emotions are perceived as being uniquely human (e.g., admiration, resentment, love, melancholy), whereas others (e.g., fear, surprise, anger, joy) are perceived as being nonuniquely human because they are experienced by both humans and animals. Furthermore, in an effort to claim superior humanity for members of one’s own group, individuals associate uniquely human emotions with the ingroup and nonuniquely human emotions with the outgroup (Paladino et al., 2002); and, they are reluctant to attribute uniquely human emotions to outgroup members (Cortes, Demoulin, P. Rodriguez, A. Rodriguez, & Leyens, 2005).

Although the emotions that Leyens et al. (2000) identify as nonuniquely human are those that are most commonly examined in research on emotion recognition through facial displays (Ekman, Sorenson & Friesen, 1969), this research on infrahumanization suggests that more subtle, complex emotions (i.e., the uniquely human emotions) may likely be misinterpreted across group boundaries. Matsumoto (2002) makes a similar argument, noting that “signal clarity” (i.e., how observable an emotion is) is an important moderator of the ingroup advantage for emotion recognition. Furthermore, Elfenbein and Ambady (2002a, 2002b) note that fear and disgust, two of the more ambiguous emotional displays, are the most poorly universally recognized emotions, but they are also the most susceptible to the ingroup advantage. Taken together, this work suggests that subtleties in emotional expression are likely to exacerbate the ingroup-advantage effect. Indeed, ingroup-favoring biases may capitalize on the subtleties and ambiguity associated with emotional expression that occur naturally in everyday interactions.

In concert with this possibility, cultural stereotypes and biases have their most profound effects and are particularly powerful in ambiguous situations (Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998). For instance, ambiguous behavior performed by black targets is more likely to be interpreted as hostile or violent than is the same behavior performed by white targets (Devine, 1989; Duncan, 1976; Sagar & Schofield, 1980). Work by Hugenberg and Bodenhausen (2003) suggests that ambiguous emotional behavior is also susceptible to the influence of cultural stereotypes. In their study, white participants were shown movie clips in which a target’s facial expression changed from angry to happy (Exp. 1) or from happy to angry (Exp. 2). Consequently, there was a period in each clip in which the facial expression of the target was relatively ambiguous.

Two of the targets were computer-generated faces of black individuals and two were of white individuals. Hugenberg and Bodenhausen (2003) predicted that if the cultural stereotype of blacks as violent influences perceptions of emotional displays, then individuals should be slower to recognize happiness but faster to recognize anger in the faces of black targets. Consistent with this prediction, participants were slower to recognize that black faces had changed from angry to happy and faster to recognize that they had changed from happy to angry, but only if the participants held relatively negative implicit associations about blacks.

In addition to these general cultural stereotypes, there are stereotypes and expectations regarding the expressivity of members of different groups (Kirouac & Hess, 1999). For example, in North America, women are thought to be more emotionally expressive in general, as well as more likely to show expressions of happiness and to smile more than men (Briton & Hall, 1995; Hess et al., 2000). Japanese nationals are thought to be less expressive, particularly when displaying anger, than Europeans and European Americans (Pittam, Gallois, Iwawaki, & Kroonenberg, 1995). These stereotypes and, sometimes, actual group differences (LaFrance, Hecht, & Paluck, 2003) can shape the interpretation of emotional facial displays (Kirouac & Hess, 1999). For example, if a person believes that women are less likely to display (and feel) anger than men, then an angry facial display on a female face may be discounted and rated as less intense than the same display on a male face (Hess, Blairy, & Klick, 1997). Consequently, as Hugenberg and Bodenhausen (2003) note, “stereotypic expectancies appear to penetrate a fundamental aspect of on-line person perception” (p. 643).

Taken together, the research reviewed in this section suggests that social categorization activates – often without awareness or control – ingroup-favoring orientations and stereotypic associations that can influence ongoing attributions of the emotional facial displays of others. In addition, the general evaluative biases that accompany recognition of different group memberships can produce biased evaluation of the emotional behaviors of both ingroup (Beaupre & Hess, 2003) and outgroup (Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003) members. These prejudices may be blatant or subtle (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986), and often people who have explicitly nonprejudiced attitudes may still harbor implicit intergroup biases (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004) that shape, in part, the interpretation of facial displays of emotion.
Power and Status

Although differences in nonverbal accents, attention, ingroup favoritism, and stereotypes may help explain the ingroup advantage for emotion recognition, these factors and processes do not provide much of an account for differences in the magnitude of the ingroup advantage. Recall that Elfenbein and Ambady’s (2002a) meta-analytic review demonstrated that the advantage in accuracy for judging the emotion from facial expressions of ingroup relative to outgroup members was weaker for minority than majority group members. Psychological processes linked to status and power, however, may provide some insight. Power and status are relational concepts that often are contextually determined; however, because many societies are rigidly structured according to group hierarchy, group membership is often correlated with relatively stable status arrangements. For example, in the United States, whites have generally had higher status and greater social power than blacks.

As outlined earlier, differences in status can systematically affect recognition of emotion from facial expressions in intergroup contexts. Status influences nonverbal expression and, thus, the opportunity to learn to recognize emotions. Because high-status people express their emotions more openly than low-status people, members of minority groups may find it easier to read majority-group members’ emotions than majority-group members can accurately interpret the emotional expressions of minority-group members during intergroup interactions. In addition, because minority-group members have more contact with majority-group members than the reverse (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2000), they have higher levels of intergroup familiarity. Relatedly, because minorities have greater exposure to the dominant culture than majority-group members have to subcultures, minorities may have a better knowledge of the differences in display and decoding rules across the groups. All of these factors can help explain why power and status moderate the difference in accuracy in intragroup and intergroup judgments of emotional facial expressions.

In addition, status also influences the motivation to try to interpret emotions from facial expressions. Because they are relatively low in power, members of minority groups tend to pay more attention to the specific actions and expressions of majority-group members, perceive them in a more individualized way, and rely less on stereotypes and other generalized responses than majority-group members do of minority-group members. That is, because members of the majority groups generally have more control over resources than do minority-group members, minorities may be more motivated to understand the actions and expressions of majorities than majorities are to interpret the expressions of minorities. Research reveals that powerful people and those in high-status positions pay less attention to their subordinates than subordinates do to them (Fiske, 1993), largely due to the asymmetry in outcome dependency. That is, lower status individuals’ material outcomes tend to depend more on the emotional reactions and impressions of higher status individuals than the reverse. Consequently, members of minority groups may be more motivated to attend to the facial displays of emotions of majority-group members than majority-group members are to the facial displays of minority-group members.

Furthermore, according to the subordination hypothesis (Henley, 1977; LaFrance & Henley, 1994), chronic stigmatization—which involves perceived status differences and associated prejudice—produces functional adaptations. In particular, members of oppressed groups are hypothesized to be more sensitive and attentive to their social environment. According to this perspective, therefore, members of minority groups tend to reveal less of an ingroup advantage than members of majority groups because they are better decoders of nonverbal behavior, including emotional facial displays. In other words, minority-group members reveal less of an ingroup advantage because they are equally as good as majority-group members at decoding the facial expressions of ingroup members but better than majority-group members at decoding outgroup facial expressions.

Evidence in support of the subordination hypothesis has been found in research observing differences in the accuracy with which whites and blacks decode one another’s nonverbal behavior. As mentioned previously, for example, Nowicki et al. (1998) found that white college students decoded the emotional facial expressions of white targets more accurately than those of black targets, but black college students were equally able to decode the emotional facial displays of white and black targets. Furthermore, Halberstadt’s (1985) meta-analysis of racial differences revealed that although black children (ages four to eleven) showed equivalent or slightly lower levels of decoding accuracy relative to whites, black college students showed a higher level of accuracy
Implications for Intergroup Interactions

Like other aspects of nonverbal communication, the communication of emotion through facial expressions may be better understood within the context of a naturally occurring interaction. Interactions between members of different social-identity groups provide a meaningful context in which to examine the expression and interpretation of emotional facial displays. It is striking, however, that little research has attempted to examine the communication of emotion through the face during intergroup interactions. Both accurate and inaccurate interpretations of emotional facial displays could undermine successful encounters between members of different groups. Moreover, reactions to the emotional facial displays of outgroup interaction partners are likely to influence individuals' own experiences during the interaction.

The research that has privileged the study of emotional facial displays within the interaction context considers both the expressive and communicative aspects of emotional faces. For instance, anger constitutes an individual's particular feeling state, but it also serves as a signal to other people what that individual might do (Adams & Kleck, 2005; Frijda & Mesquita, 1994). When someone looks at you with an angry facial expression, you know that he or she does not intend to take a nap. Furthermore, within the context of an interaction, facial behavior can serve a number of functions simultaneously. For instance, a frown displayed by one's interaction partner could signal sadness or irritation, effortful processing of what one is saying, or both. Consequently, it is important to consider the context of the interaction, including the concerns that individuals bring with them to the interaction, to understand the facial displays they exhibit and the ways in which those displays are likely to be interpreted by their interaction partners (Kaiser & Wehrle, 2004).

In an effort to shape and direct research on intergroup interactions, Hebl and Dovidio (2005) developed a model that outlines key elements in the dynamics of communication in an intergroup context. Although not expressly developed to understand the nonverbal communication of emotion between members of different groups, the model can advance understanding of this topic. Building on Patterson's (1982) Sequential Functional Model of Nonverbal Exchange, Hebl and Dovidio (2005) note that people approach each other with preexisting orientations (i.e., antecedent conditions) - such as personal factors, experiential factors, and relational/situational factors - that can influence whether and how they interact. These antecedent conditions trigger pre-interaction
variables in the context – such as cognitions (including stereotypes) and affective reactions, levels of arousal, and behavioral propensities to act – that mediate the effect of these preexisting orientations on both verbal and nonverbal behavior during the interaction. During the course of the interaction, individuals determine whether both their own and their partner’s levels of involvement match their expectations, which, in turn, influence cognition and affect both during and after the interaction.

The model is helpful because it articulates important aspects of both the interactants and the interaction that are likely to influence the expression and interpretation of emotional facial displays. Consider a dyadic interaction between a white and a black individual. According to the Hebl and Dovidio (2005) model, antecedent factors such as the individuals’ racial attitudes, previous experience with interracial contact, and relationship to one another are all likely to impact their emotional communication during the interaction. For instance, negative racial attitudes, especially those held at a relatively unconscious level, predispose white individuals to reveal negative nonverbal behavior during interracial interactions that is often detected by their black interaction partners (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002). It is interesting that although unaware of their own communication of negative nonverbal behavior, white individuals with more negative, implicit racial attitudes may be especially likely to detect negative affect in the face of black interaction partners (Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003). Considered in tandem, this work makes it relatively easy to see how emotional communication may contribute to the negative experiences individuals have during interactions across group boundaries.

However, interactions in which both interactants have considerable interracial contact experience may proceed quite differently. Previous contact is associated with more positive racial attitudes (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2000) and should translate into more positive emotional facial displays. Furthermore, greater levels of interracial contact suggest greater familiarity with the nonverbal accents of outgroup members, which, in turn, facilitate the accurate communication of emotion (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002a, 2003).

Similar to the antecedent factors, many of the pre-interaction mediators identified in the Hebl and Dovidio (2005) model are also likely to shape the communication of emotion. As discussed previously, for instance, stereotypes that individuals hold about one another’s groups influence both the expression and interpretation of emotion (e.g., Beaupré & Hess, 2003). The affect that is often triggered in interracial interactions is also important to consider when thinking about emotional communication in the intergroup context. Specifically, intergroup contact is often a source of anxiety, distress, and even threat for some individuals (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Under these circumstances, accurate communication of emotion may be particularly difficult. When individuals are feeling anxious, their own emotional facial displays are likely to be more difficult to decode, while at the same time they will be more susceptible to misinterpreting neutral or slightly negative facial expressions on the part of their interaction partners (Fox et al., 2000).

Moreover, Leyens, Demoulin, Desert, Vaes, and Philippot (2002) found that apprehension associated with intergroup relations may inhibit the expression of emotions that can convey interest and involvement in intergroup contact. Leyens et al. (2002) asked white students in Belgium to pose emotions for a black or white photographer. In addition, the participants were told that individuals of the same race as the photographer would see the pictures. Participants were asked how effectively they communicated their emotions, and judges evaluated how effectively the emotions were conveyed. Results revealed that participants reported that they were more expressive and conveyed their emotions better for an outgroup audience than for an ingroup audience. According to the judges, however, participants conveyed emotions significantly less effectively for the outgroup audience than the ingroup audience. Consistent with other work examining the perception of friendship overtures toward ingroup compared to outgroup members (Vorauer, 2005), this work suggests that individuals tend to overestimate the intensity and clarity of their emotional expression during intergroup interactions. Considered in tandem with the research reviewed previously, this work suggests that the affect most often triggered in interracial contact—that is, anxiety—may be the least likely to facilitate accurate emotion recognition or result in positive interaction experiences.

Motivations and goals are another pre-interaction mediator identified in Hebl and Dovidio’s (2005) model that should influence both the expression and interpretation of emotion in the face. Whites’ concerns about appearing prejudiced often initiate self-regulatory processes designed to suppress and/or control the expression of negative feelings and thoughts during the interaction (Richeson & Trawalter, 2005). These self-regulatory efforts may result in overly controlled, rigid behavior (Richeson & Shelton, 2003). Blacks, in contrast, are often concerned about being the target of prejudice and stereotypes, and these concerns
influence their behavior during interracial interactions. Blacks' concerns about being the target of prejudice, for example, can facilitate overtly positive behavior on their part in the service of fostering a smooth interaction (Shelton, Richeson, & Salvatore, 2005).

In addition, these interpersonal concerns about prejudice may influence individuals' ability to decode their interaction partners' facial expressions. For instance, concerns about being the target of prejudice may make black individuals particularly sensitive to the emotional facial displays of their interaction partners (Frable et al., 1990). By contrast, because they are more likely to be self-focused (Vorauer, Hunter, Main, & Roy, 2000), whites who are concerned about appearing prejudiced may be insensitive to the emotional facial displays of their black interaction partners. Consequently, individuals' motivations stemming from their distinct prejudice concerns may set up a scenario in which whites are less accurate at decoding blacks' emotional facial displays than the accuracy with which blacks are able to decode the facial displays of their white partners—a pattern that mimics the differences in the ingroup advantage for members of majority and minority groups discussed previously.

In contrast, the opposite decoding advantage may emerge. That is, white individuals in the interaction may be able to decode their black partner's emotional facial displays more accurately than their partner can detect their facial displays. To the extent that blacks are concerned about being the target of prejudice, they may display overtly positive behavior that is relatively easy to decode. However, the facial displays associated with effortful self-regulation on the part of whites, particularly as they attempt to avoid appearing prejudiced, may be particularly difficult to decode. Consequently, the black interaction partner may find it more difficult to read the emotional displays of the white partner than the white partner finds it to read the emotional displays of the black partner. It is important that although individuals may find it relatively hard or easy to decode one another's emotional displays, these displays may not reveal individuals' true emotional reactions to the interaction. As mentioned before, participants' interaction concerns prompt them to attempt to mask their true feelings. Both participants' attempts to dissociate their own facial expressions of emotion from their emotional experiences may make the interpretation of emotional expressions and experiences during interracial interactions particularly difficult and wrought with miscommunication.

In sum, in this section we attempted to explore the implications of previous research on intergroup relations for the communication of emotion through facial displays in an intergroup context. We employed aspects of Hebl and Dovidio's (2005) model of mixed social interactions to underscore the complexity of emotion recognition across group boundaries. The strength of this approach is the simultaneous consideration of how both interaction participants' attitudes, previous experiences, and concerns might shape both their expression and interpretation of emotion in the face. By exploring emotion recognition in the context of intergroup interactions, researchers will be more likely to capture the true richness, ambiguity, and complexity of emotional facial expression and interpretation across group boundaries. Consequently, we believe that this type of research is crucial to understanding intergroup communication and, ultimately, intergroup relations.

Conclusion

The present chapter explored the recognition of emotional facial displays in an intergroup context. Given that group membership fundamentally affects the way people think about, feel about, and behave with others, we proposed that psychological processes associated with social categorization and social identity are likely also to produce systematic biases in the recognition of emotion across group boundaries. Through a review of the literature on emotion recognition, we examined the ways in which group membership affects the recognition of emotion displayed in the face, and how members of different groups—defined by majority and minority status—may be differentially successful at recognizing and interpreting the emotions displayed by outgroup members. That is, we considered the ways in which processes identified in the intergroup-relations literature contribute to the systematic nature of emotion recognition accuracy and inaccuracy between members of different groups.

At the end of the chapter, we considered how the context of an intergroup dyadic interaction is likely to influence the communication of emotional facial displays. This final analysis revealed the complexity of emotion communication across group boundaries. Specifically, drawing on Hebl and Dovidio's (2005) model, we proposed that in addition to their affective states, individuals' previous experiences, goals, concerns, and attitudes are likely to influence the ways in which they express and
interpret facial displays of emotion during intergroup interactions. In sum, the chapter provides a conceptual analysis of how the study of facial expressions complements previous research on intergroup bias and, consequently, argues that examining emotional facial displays in an intergroup context offers potentially unique theoretical insight into both emotion recognition and intergroup relations.

References


2. When Two Do the Same, It Might Not Mean the Same

The Perception of Emotional Expressions Shown by Men and Women

Ursula Hess, Reginald B. Adams, Jr., and Robert E. Kleck

When he appears as a Ghost he had a countenance more in sorrow than in anger.
(Shakespeare, Hamlet, I.iii.232)

Authors’ Note

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Introduction

Humans are very sensitive to faces. Faces attract attention and have an important impact on our perception of a social interaction. Faces inform us about the gender, ethnicity, age, and state of health of our interaction partners and also convey information about their likely intelligence, maturity, dominance, sociability, and many other characteristics. In addition, human faces are able to communicate information about the emotions of others. Thus, faces provide us with important hints